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A B S T R A C T
Keeping global mean temperature rise well below 2 °C requires deep emission reductions in all industrial sectors,
but several barriers inhibit such transitions. A special type of barrier is carbon lock-in, deﬁned as a process
whereby various forms of increasing returns to adoption inhibit innovation and the competitiveness of low-
carbon alternatives, resulting in further path dependency. Here, we explore potential carbon lock-in in the Dutch
chemical industry via semi-structured interviews with eleven key actors. We ﬁnd that carbon lock-in may be the
result of (i) technological incompatibility between deep emission reduction options over time, (ii) system in-
tegration in chemical clusters, (iii) increasing sunk costs as ﬁrms continue to invest in incremental improvements
in incumbent installations, (iv) governmental policy inconsistency between targets for energy eﬃciency and
deep emission reductions, and (v) existing safety routines and standards. We also identify barriers that do not
have the self-reinforcing character of lock-in, but do inhibit deep emission reductions. Examples include high
operating costs of low-carbon options and low risk acceptance by capital providers and shareholders. Rooted in
the Dutch policy setting, we discuss policy responses for avoiding carbon lock-in and overcoming barriers based
on the interviews, such as transition plans for individual industries and infrastructure subsidies.
1. Introduction
Keeping global warming below 2 °C requires a 85–90% reduction in
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emission between 2015 and 2050 [1] and
the 1.5 °C limit in the Paris Agreement even requires global CO2-neu-
trality in 2050 [2]. Such emission targets are hereinafter referred to as
deep emission reductions (DER). The chemical industry, including
petrochemicals, is one of the most GHG-intensive industries, and
globally accounts for 16% of industrial direct CO2 emissions and ap-
proximately 7% of total GHG emissions [3]. Direct emissions from the
chemical industry arise mainly from fuel combustion to produce elec-
tricity and high-temperature heat, and also as by-products directly from
chemical processes. A relatively small group of base chemical outputs,
in particular ammonia, ethylene and chlorine, are responsible for two-
thirds of the chemical industry's GHG emissions. The products of these
base chemicals are used in various sectors. For example, fertilisers are
used in agriculture and plastics in the packaging industry [4].
The Netherlands is one of the world's largest producers and ex-
porters of chemicals [5]. The chemical industry makes a signiﬁcant
contribution to the Dutch economy with a share of 1.6% of GDP [6] and
18% of total Dutch export in 2016 [7]. The turnover of the Dutch
chemical industry (DCI) in 2015 was €45 billion [8], and 43,000 people
were directly employed in the sector in 2015 [9]. At the same time, the
DCI accounted for approximately 8% (18 MtCO2-eq) of the Netherlands’
total GHG emissions (233 MtCO2-eq) in 2015 [10]. Energy intensity in
the DCI improved by 39% between 2000 and 2012, which put it
amongst the most energy eﬃcient chemical industries in Europe [11].
In 2013, an Energy Agreement was signed by the Dutch government
and more than forty societal organisations, including the Association
for the Dutch Chemical Industry (VNCI). The Energy Agreement in-
cluded a goal to save a total of 100 petajoule (PJ) by 2020 in industry
[12,13]. Moreover, in May 2019, a Climate Law was passed by the
Dutch Senate, committing the Netherlands to a 49% GHG emission
reduction in 2030 and 95% in 2050, compared to 1990. A Climate
Agreement has been proposed with measures for diﬀerent sectors, in-
cluding industry [14].
Current obligations and past achievements notwithstanding, many
reports and studies indicate that achieving DER in the chemical in-
dustry requires measures beyond current energy eﬃciency improve-
ments [15,16] and even an ‘industrial system transition’ [2]. According
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to these studies, a combination of various DER measures is required,
including novel technologies related to radical options. Those DER
options are categorised by IPCC [2] as well as the Dutch Ministry for
Economic Aﬀairs and Climate Policy [17] as full electriﬁcation and
hydrogen, circularity and substitution, bio-based, carbon dioxide cap-
ture, utilisation and storage (CCS/CCU), and process and energy eﬃ-
ciency, where the latter one is not considered DER unless combined
with one of the other categories.
Adoption of several of those options, however, may be inhibited by
lock-in. Their uptake depends path-dependency based on historical
preferences and development of existing technologies in the system
[18]. Arthur [19] argued that existing complex technologies exhibit
increasing returns to adoption; the more they are implemented, the
more experience is accumulated, and, consequently, the more they are
improved.
Several studies have identiﬁed general barriers that energy-in-
tensive industries face to reach DER, including the lack of end-user
demand for low-carbon products due to the business-to-business char-
acter of basic industry products, the high capital costs and long in-
vestment cycles and payback times, the risk of losing competitive ad-
vantage in the global market, and the lack of suﬃcient prioritisation
and policy eﬀort [4,9,16]. Carbon lock-in has been investigated in
sectors such as energy [30], transport [31], agriculture and infra-
structure [32]. However, potential carbon lock-in in the industry sector,
and how to respond to that, has to our knowledge only been char-
acterised in the concrete industry [33], and largely remains an open
question [16].
We hypothesise in this paper that, in addition to general barriers,
the DCI is at risk of carbon lock-in, given its existing path-dependent,
highly optimised and integrated system that has exhibited strong in-
creasing returns to past adoption. Similarly to other sectors, those in-
creasing returns and the high reversal costs to a new system stimulate
ﬁrms to try safeguarding their vested interests [34], hampering im-
plementation of the DER technologies. Failing to deal with carbon lock-
in in a timely and adequate manner makes a low-carbon transition even
more diﬃcult or economically unsustainable for the DCI in the long
run. In this paper, we investigate whether such potential carbon lock-in
exists for the DCI, and if so, what are the components of such a potential
carbon lock-in and what could be possible policy responses.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the con-
ceptual framework, data collection and the analysis. In Section 3, we
present and discuss our results on carbon lock-in and other barriers and
compare our ﬁndings with carbon lock-in studies in other sectors. In
Section 4, our ﬁndings on policy responses to avoid such carbon lock-in
and barriers will be presented and discussed. Finally, Section 5 provides
conclusions, recommendations for future work, and discusses limita-
tions of our research.
2. Methods
2.1. Conceptual framework
In general, increasing returns to adoption resulting in path depen-
dence [18,19] of fossil fuel-based technologies is the main criterion for
carbon lock-in. When actors have gained vested interests in a sector or
technology, and the system enabling it, [33,35], they tend to continue
down a speciﬁc path, following initial steps taken in that direction [36].
Moving down such a path makes it diﬃcult to reverse course as the
costs of reversal are very high [36,37]. This situation can lock the
system in a particular technology [37–39] and any old or new alter-
natives, even when superior, could become locked-out [19]. Path de-
pendence and increasing returns to adoption have been emphasised as
core concepts in the lock-in literature [18,19,31,40–48].
Lock-in can also be related to the challenge of implementation of
new low-carbon technologies, constraining institutional, technological,
social, and economic eﬀorts towards DER [42,44]. For example, Seto
et al. ([44], p. 426) deﬁne carbon lock-in as “a path-dependent process
(…) whereby initial conditions, increasing economic returns to scale
and social and individual dynamics act to inhibit innovation and
competitiveness of low-carbon alternatives”. Wesseling and Van der
Vooren [33] give carbon lock-in a slightly diﬀerent spin by demon-
strating the interaction between system components in the concrete
industry. They map structural components in the technological in-
novation system of the concrete industry, analyse system functions, and
then identify systemic problems that inhibit the functioning of the in-
novation system that could move towards low-carbon innovation. They
argue that lock-in emerges when a set of interdependent systemic
problems and vested interests reinforce each other in one or more
closed feedback cycles.
The approach taken in our paper complements Wesseling and Van
der Vooren [33] and others discussing carbon lock-in [30,49]. We
follow Arthur [41] and Unruh [43], who argue that carbon lock-in
emerges “through combined interactions among technological systems
and governing institutions” ([43], p. 817) and operationalise path de-
pendence in four types of increasing returns to adoption (see below).
Lock-in emerges because actors try to maintain and upgrade the
dominant design by incremental improvements that do not jeopardise
continuity of the production. An example in industry is energy eﬃ-
ciency measures. Such incremental improvements increase returns for
the incumbent system, but at the same time increase reversal costs to a
carbon-saving system leading to inertia to implement any disruptive
technologies [36,37,50], such as DER options.
Based on Arthur [42] and Unruh [43], in this paper, we distinguish
four types of increasing returns to adoption: Economies of scale,
learning eﬀects, adaptive expectations, and network economies.
“Economies of scale” refers to reduced unit production costs due to the
spread of ﬁxed costs over increasing production volume. “Learning ef-
fects” improve performance by gaining more knowledge and experience
from a technology over time. “Adaptive expectations” arise when in-
crease in adoption of a technology reduces uncertainty, and as a result
increases conﬁdence of users and producers in quality, performance and
permanence of the product and process. And ﬁnally, “network econo-
mies” occur when there are advantages in adopting the same tech-
nology that others apply.
Not all barriers to DER in the chemical industry can be characterised
according to these four categories of lock-in.1 Hence, we diﬀerentiate
between ’normal’ barriers and a special category of barriers which are
(carbon) lock-ins. This distinction is relevant as carbon lock-in requires
a diﬀerent policy response [49,51].
2.2. Data collection
We conducted eleven semi-structured interviews with key actors
involved in the transition of the DCI towards DER. The interviewees
(see Table 1) were selected from diﬀerent types of organisations to
provide a diverse set of perspectives and insights on the subject. All
interviews were recorded, transcribed and sent to the interviewees for
review. Eight interviewees reviewed the transcripts and of those, seven
gave additional information. This additional information was included
as an addendum to the transcripts. The duration of the interviews was
on average around 60 min with variations between 30 and 90 min.
We described views of the interviewees and refer to one, several
(2–4), many (5–7), most (7–10) and all (11) interviewees expressing the
same view on a certain topic. When few interviewees commented on a
particular issue (e.g. because some of the interviewees did not feel
suﬃciently qualiﬁed to comment on technical issues), this is re-
presented in the results section.
The interview data were triangulated with a document analysis of
1We assume that all lock-in associated with DER is carbon lock-in, and apply
the same characteristics.
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roadmaps, policy documents and public statements of relevant in-
dustries, governmental and non-governmental organisations.
2.3. Data analysis
We took a thematic analysis approach to analyse the interviews.
Transcripts were coded using the four types of increasing returns [42]
to identify which barriers are carbon lock-in. Out of eleven interviews,
six were coded independently by two researchers to ensure consistent
treatment and remove bias, ﬁve more were coded by one researcher,
and all the coded interviews were discussed in details amongst the re-
searchers until consensus about the coding was reached. This resulted
in a list of factors that could be sources of carbon lock-in for the DCI.
Any problem mentioned by the interviewees that met one or more of
the four characteristics (economies of scale, learning eﬀects, adaptive
expectations, and network economies) was classiﬁed as a carbon lock-
in. Other factors mentioned by the interviewees were categorised as
barriers. Policy responses to carbon lock-in were coded openly and are
discussed separately in Section 4. The codes were ﬁnally grouped into
three broad categories: carbon lock-in, other barriers, and policy re-
sponses.
3. Carbon lock-in and barriers
In this section, we present the results of the thematic analysis in the
interviews, and a document review. The results are organised by type of
barrier. The ﬁrst section discusses the barriers that show carbon lock-in
characteristics, and the second section the other barriers arising from
the interviews are discussed. The thematic analysis led to a list of nine
barriers that relates to DER in the DCI. From the nine factors arising
from the thematic analysis, ﬁve are considered to be carbon lock-in.
They are: 1) technological incompatibility, 2) system integration, 3)
sunk costs, 4) policy inconsistency, and 5) safety routines. The re-
maining four types are classiﬁed as other barriers, i.e. 6) cost compe-
titive fossil fuel and feedstock, 7) turnaround and payback times, 8) low
risk acceptance by capital providers and shareholders, and 9) customers
behaviour and choice. Table 2 shows the classiﬁcation of the carbon
lock-in types, and associated types of increasing returns to adoption.
3.1. Barriers with carbon lock-in characteristics
3.1.1. Technological incompatibility
We refer to technological incompatibility when a DER technology is
incompatible with another DER option, or with existing technology, in
the chemical industry. Technological incompatibility means a DER
technology cannot be operated alongside the other technology. While
several technological (in)compatibilities could be identiﬁed, the inter-
viewees tended to focus on the incompatibility between electriﬁcation
and CCS2 in the chemical industry.
Many interviewees pointed out the incompatibility between elec-
triﬁcation and CCS technologies (aside from CCS applied to hydrogen or
energy production). This incompatibility will emerge when elec-
triﬁcation (by renewable electricity) is implemented, and no CO2 is
emitted anymore by the installations, rendering CCS inapplicable. Yet,
many interviewees mentioned that CCS is an inevitable option to reach
DER in the DCI, because it is the most viable and easy option in the
short term, and emissions need to go down without delay. Several in-
terviewees noted that CCS will be a temporary measure, operating for a
limited but suﬃcient period of time for companies to recuperate their
investments in CCS. However, several other interviewees ﬂagged that
the combination of CCS with current hydrogen production (through the
steam methane reforming (SMR) process) will make low-carbon elec-
triﬁcation harder to realise. The same interviewees argued that CCS is
currently more attractive than electriﬁcation, because it is cheaper and
more compatible with current installations, especially in the petro-
chemical industry, allowing continuity of current production processes
while reducing CO2 emissions but without moving to a truly sustainable
chemical industry. According to them, CCS will therefore be a lock-in,
inhibiting electriﬁcation to be applied in the DCI. Another interviewee
pointed out that in the longer run, CCS may run out of CO2 if it is used
Table 1
List of interviewees. All interviews except for the Urgenda interview were in-person. The interviews took place in November 2017. All interviewees were either high-
level managers or senior advisors of the organisation.
Type of organisation Organisation Position in the organisation
NGOs Urgenda (by phone) High-level manager
Industry association VNPI (The Dutch Petroleum Industry Association) High-level manager
VNCI (The Dutch Chemical Industry Association) High-level manager
Industry Royal Dutch Shell Senior advisor
AkzoNobel High-level manager
Chemelot High-level manager
Government Ministry of Economic Aﬀairs and Climate Policy Senior policy advisor
Senior policy oﬃcer
Public Limited Company Port Authority of Rotterdam (group interview)a High-level manager, two senior advisors
Research institute/Consultancy PBL (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency) Senior advisor
Quintel High-level manager
a The interview was planned to take place with a high-level manager at the Port Authority of Rotterdam, but two colleagues were also available at the time of the
interview and were invited to participate in the interview as well.
Table 2
Overview of ﬁve carbon lock-in themes, resulting from the thematic analysis of
the interviews, and what type of increasing returns to adoption are observed per
theme.
Theme Type of increasing returns to adoption
Technological incompatibility • Economies of scale• Learning eﬀects• Adaptive expectations
System integration • Economies of scale• Learning eﬀects• Adaptive expectations• Network economies
Sunk costs • Economies of scale
Policy inconsistency • Economies of scale• Learning eﬀects• Adaptive expectations
Safety routines • Learning eﬀects• Adaptive expectations
2 One reﬂection on why only the CCS/electriﬁcation trade-oﬀ appeared in the
interviews may have had to do with the timing: a new Government Agreement
had just come out which included a proposal to implement 18 MtCO2 of CCS in
industry per year by 2030 [76], quite a sizeable amount that spurred much
discussion and that may have dominated the moods of the interviewees at that
time.
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for power-to-gas, in which CO2 emitted when making hydrogen through
SMR would be used to produce methane, which is then used as a fuel.
Some interviewees pointed at the possibility of hybrid boilers, as those
would allow for partial electriﬁcation and could become a bridge to full
electriﬁcation.
Consistent with the point several interviewees made on the poten-
tial role of CCS to become a source of carbon lock-in, CCS has been
framed as hampering implementation of other more sustainable options
in several stakeholder sources. A common point made against CCS is
that CCS will provide the possibility to perpetuate fossil fuel con-
sumption and distract society form realising more sustainable tech-
nologies required for a fully renewable industry and energy system
[45,52–55]. The compatibility with current business routines and lower
costs, also because electriﬁcation would increase costs for renewable
electricity generation, are reasons for industry associations to look at
CCS favourably [9]. Environmental NGOs, such as Greenpeace, how-
ever argue that CCS will divert investments away from more sustainable
options required for a fully renewable-based energy system [51,56].
Alternatives for CCS and their potential estimated CO2 emissions
abatement and costs are investigated in a Greenpeace-backed report
[57]. Those options are presented to be part of sustainable solutions
while CCS is explicitly excluded [57].
Technological compatibility matters for companies to maintain
continuity of production, to avoid additional ﬁxed costs. Thus, tech-
nological incompatibility of DER options with current systems is a
carbon lock-in, as investments are made in incumbent production sys-
tems lead to increasing returns to adoption through economies of scale
as well as adaptive expectations. In addition, many of the learning ef-
fects of the current technologies over time may become obsolete, while
for any new DER technology, learning and knowledge accumulation has
to start from scratch.
3.1.2. System integration
The DCI, for example in the Rijnmond (Rotterdam harbour), in
Chemelot (the former DSM complex near Geleen in the southeast of the
country) or in Zeeland (in the southwest around Terneuzen and
Vlissingen) is often co-located in highly integrated industrial clusters.
Regarding the interaction of such chemical industry clusters with the
DER options, many interviewees expected that the residual heat grids,
which are being constructed now to supply excess industrial heat to
households, will be at risk of becoming stranded assets if future tech-
nologies produce less or zero residual heat. One of the interviewees
commented that the technical integration of the chemical clusters in the
Netherlands has been an advantage for energy eﬃciency improve-
ments, but this highly optimised integration reduces the economic at-
tractiveness of DERs. Another interviewee felt that the cluster integra-
tion, implying centralisation, would limit companies’ options for
switching feedstock and technologies. It was also claimed by another
interviewee that the replacement of the current installations with al-
ternative options would throw the existing integrated, optimised system
out of balance, leading to wasting of materials and energy.
System integration in general has been seen as an advantage rather
than a barrier to reach DER in industry reports [9]. Even further in-
tegration to improve circularity is advised in one of the site plans for
climate neutrality [58]. However, potential system integration lock-in,
speciﬁcally on the waste heat exchange between chemical companies
and their vicinities, has also been explicitly ﬂagged [59]. Moreover, it is
indicated that the lock-in eﬀect of such cross-sectional waste heat ex-
change may prevent further eﬃciency improvements at the plant level
[4]. Others expect that some of this type of lock-in also might be ap-
plied to hybrid boilers as it is not easy to implement them in every
industrial setting and replacement of an individual piece of an in-
dustrial facility may require a big change in the entire system [24],
bringing new sunk costs to the system and increasing the switching
costs to the fully renewable industrial system. This point has been also
discussed by Bataille et al. [22]: there are potential transition pathways
(e.g. through using hybrid technologies) that allow industry to mini-
mise stranded assets while reducing emissions through a gradual shift
from limited contribution of renewables to fully renewable options,
however they express doubt of whether such transition pathways would
make economic sense in contrast with the option of direct use of re-
newables in new low-carbon facilities. This implies the potential risk of
future lock-in in such transition models, hampering the DER achieve-
ment.
System integration shows carbon lock-in of all four types of in-
creasing returns. The existing clusters obviously thrive on economies of
scale and network eﬀects, which both reinforce the incumbent system.
In addition, learning about integration may not be transferrable to low-
carbon chemical clusters, and actors show conﬁdence in the perfor-
mance of the cluster, using incumbent technologies and processes
(adaptive expectations).
3.1.3. Sunk costs
According to several interviewees, high capital costs of existing
long-lived installations means that the DCI is incentivised to continue
running current assets, which deters it from investing in DER. One of
the interviewees mentioned that any investment in current installations
will mean those installations remain in operation for 20 to 30 years or
more.
Several interviewees also argued that further energy eﬃciency op-
timisation of the existing installations could present a lock-in situation,
especially when payback times of such investments are long. They in-
dicated that such sunk costs would also be increased in industry's eﬀorts
to meet the energy saving target of 100 PJ by 2020 in the Dutch Energy
Agreement [12] (see also the next section). Sooner or later the existing
installations will have to be replaced with DER technologies, which
would render the energy savings investments as stranded assets.
The large scale of chemical industry installations and associated
high capital (and sunk) costs are driven by economies of scale that have
been built up over a long period of time. Any replacement of the in-
stallations due to fast adoption of DER technologies deprives companies
of signiﬁcant income out of the current system, making sunk costs a
source of carbon lock-in.
3.1.4. Policy inconsistency
The Dutch Energy Agreement (2013) aimed at saving 100 PJ by
2020. At the same time, the government is determined to achieve an
emission reduction target of 95% below 1990 levels in 2050. Most of
the interviewees observed a discrepancy between DER and the energy
saving target, as they argue achieving the DER goal requires higher
energy consumption, particularly in case of CCS deployment.
Furthermore, several interviewees pointed out that limited resources
and constraints in time would lead to economic and temporal trade-oﬀs
between meeting energy and DER targets.
Several interviewees indicated the potential consequences of policy
inconsistency for the DCI as an entity. The same interviewees expressed
concern that the discrepancy between policy targets might lead to
business outﬂow from the Netherlands to elsewhere, especially of the
companies headquartered outside the Netherlands, and consequently
potentially to carbon leakage. Nonetheless, one of the interviewees
argued that the business outﬂow would be diﬃcult for the companies
since they are operating in highly integrated and inter-dependent
chemical clusters. It should also be noted that the Dutch government is
not blind to this inconsistency: one of the interviewees indicated that
the Dutch government is aware of the conﬂict between the energy and
DER targets and policies, but indicated that attempts to modify EU
regulation have not been successful up to now.
The VNCI [9] explicitly ﬂags the potential lock-in resulting from
short-term emission reduction measures in existing fossil-based tech-
nologies. It is argued that such short-term improvements will lead to
higher sunk costs, impeding DER technology implementation. As for
many chemical processes and companies only one investment cycle
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remains until 2050, the window for investments into DER options, as
long-term solutions, is closing, in favour of short-term improvements in
existing installations. DECHEMA [4] suggests that investments in the
eﬃciency measures in the current fossil fuel-based plants will be in
competition with the DER options and create a source of carbon lock-in.
Policy inconsistency, in many cases, is just a normal barrier, but in
the case mentioned by the interviewees, it is a carbon lock-in resem-
bling the “sunk cost” carbon lock-in discussed in the previous section.
Any energy eﬃciency improvements in the exiting fossil-based tech-
nologies of DCI to achieve the energy eﬃciency goal will add more sunk
costs to the current incumbent system, leading to higher reversal costs
to a lower-carbon system. In addition, the learning eﬀects for knowl-
edge to reach the earlier target (for instance legal, registration and
monitoring skills) can become obsolete if an inconsistent policy is
eventually made consistent.
3.1.5. Safety routines
According to several interviewees, the chemical industry puts much
emphasis on safety considerations, given the risks associated with
chemical plants. One of the interviewees indicated that, for the DCI,
applying new technologies entails new safety risks as safety tests need
to be redone, new safety routines need to be developed, and the acci-
dent risk is potentially temporarily higher. Conducting new safety tests
will also slow the production rate once a DER technology is up and
running, leading to additional higher costs. Another interviewee ex-
plained that the engineers at the plant need to be convinced of the
safety of the new equipment.
Applying the new DER technologies safely also demands a work-
force with relevant expertise. This need could be met either by re-
training existing personnel or hiring new experts. According to several
interviewees, this would bring extra personnel costs to the chemical
companies, though they did not perceive the personnel costs as chal-
lenging.
Regarding the potential safety risks associated with applying DER
options, the IPCC [60] conﬁrms that process safety is a major concern in
the chemical industry that should be carefully considered in im-
plementation of DER options. On safety concerns and considerations,
there is similarity between the chemical industry and air traﬃc control.
Bruce and Spinardi [35] explain that the air traﬃc control sector is
reluctant to adopting other technologies, particularly due to a highly
developed safety culture [49]. Any radical change in the innovation
system is discouraged because of the high sunk costs to design a new
system and certify the safety requirements, and the perceived asso-
ciated risks [35].
The need for a new set of safety standards and routines for DER is a
carbon lock-in because of the learning eﬀects, adaptive expectation and
network eﬀects in the safety routines serving the existing system. The
current safety routines have been built up over decades and have been
successful because of continuous, cumulative learning, and adoption of
DER technologies may nullify some of those experiences and knowl-
edge. In addition, diﬀerent safety routines may initially reduce con-
ﬁdence in safe performance of the new technologies.
3.2. Other barriers
3.2.1. Cost-competitive fossil fuel and feedstock
The current DCI system runs based on fossil fuel for both energetic
and non-energetic use, but reaching DER requires abundant renewable
electricity (for electriﬁcation and electricity-based hydrogen) and/or
biomass (for high temperature heat and alternative carbonaceous
feedstock). According to many interviewees, the cost of renewable
electricity, heat and feedstock would be the main determinants for the
total cost of low-carbon production of chemical products. Most inter-
viewees ﬂagged uncertainties about availability and cost-competitive-
ness of renewable electricity and biomass. Uncertainty about future
electricity prices (partly related to uncertainty of future CO2 prices) was
highlighted by several interviewees as one of the most crucial diﬃ-
culties in the realisation of renewable electriﬁcation.
In the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report [60], insuﬃcient availability of
bio-based and waste materials as substitutes for fossil-based fuels and
feedstock is listed as one of the main concerns to reach emission re-
ductions in the chemical industry. In addition, uncertainties around the
operational costs, mainly related to prices of alternative fuels, has been
highlighted as one of the biggest challenges that the DCI faces [9,24].
This uncertainty makes it diﬃcult for companies to reliably predict the
payback time of their investments in the DER technologies, making the
investment riskier [24]. The VNCI [9] estimates that costs of renewable
feedstock and fuels in the cheapest pathway is at least 50 percent higher
than those of the fossil fuels currently used. Aﬀordability and avail-
ability of sustainable biomass is highlighted as one of the main chal-
lenges in the "Biomass and CCS" scenario for the Port of Rotterdam
[25].
As operational and feedstock costs themselves are not increasing
returns on adoption, we consider this a normal barrier. Although for
some renewable energy options the fossil advantage is shrinking [61],
in the current chemical industry system, as in many other industries,
fossil-based fuels and feedstock are cost competitive compared to re-
newable energy.
3.2.2. Turnaround and payback times
Many chemical processes require continuous operation in which all
operational steps run simultaneously. Major system overhauls cannot
be done while the plant is operational. Thus, chemical plants schedule
time periods to shut down operations. Such scheduled events are called
‘plant turnaround’. They are kept to a minimum as lost production
hours while the industrial units are oﬄine are costly, in addition to
higher labour, equipment and materials costs during the turnaround.
The turnaround interval in the chemical industry typically varies be-
tween four and six years. Several interviewees stressed the importance
of the timing of turnarounds for implementation of DER measures,
especially as the planned measures to be implemented in the next
turnaround are decided on shortly after the last turnaround has been
ﬁnalised. According to the same interviewees, if the opportunity for
implementing DER at the next turnaround is missed, either the in-
stallation replacement will take place during the later turnaround,
which may be too late to meet DER target in 2050, or extra costs are
incurred for an additional turnaround.
Turnaround relates to payback times, an aspect not mentioned
much by interviewees but highlighted in sector documents. The che-
mical industry's assets are high-value and have very long lifetimes. For
instance, a boiler is expected to work for 30 years [24]. Consequently,
payback time for replacing such an asset is long. The DCI has an interest
in running the current assets as long as possible [9,24]. A plant often
has a short window of opportunity to invest in DER as there will be only
one investment cycle for many chemical processes until 2050. It implies
that if a required DER technology is not ready to be implemented for
the next investment round, the system has to make a new replacement
with a non-DER option which brings more sunk costs to the current
system, creating carbon lock-in [9].
However, this factor is a normal barrier and not a carbon lock-in, as
the existence of long payback times and turnaround in itself does not
lead to increasing returns to adoption. Once the investment with the
long payback time is made, it is considered a sunk cost (see
Section 3.1.3). The limited amount of plant turnarounds (which are
more frequent than major re-investments in the full installations) limits
the number of investment windows for DER, but also for investments in
potentially lock-in-enhancing energy eﬃciency.
3.2.3. Low risk acceptance by capital providers and shareholders
Implementation of DER technologies bears high investment costs,
leading some companies to seek external ﬁnancing for at least part of
the investment. Several interviewees indicated that most DER
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technologies have never been applied at industrial scale, therefore, the
ﬁrst company or investor will face the largest risk. Regarding the ex-
ternal ﬁnancing, several interviewees expected that due to the high risk
of investment in DER projects, banks are also unlikely to ﬁnance ﬁrst-
of-a-kind DER projects. On the governmental side, many interviewees
mentioned the potential of Invest-NL, a new institutional impact-in-
vestor in the Netherlands, to provide insurance for ﬁnancial risk and to
support investors in risky projects. Nonetheless, several interviewees
argued that the risk acceptance of Invest-NL is uncertain. Invest-NL was
announced by the Dutch Government in 2017, and the starting date of
Invest-NL has been planned for 2019 [62].
Several interviewees stated that due to the lower short-term returns
of low- or zero-carbon products, shareholders are likely to react nega-
tively towards DER investments, and favour investment that have a
high-value track record. The same interviewees mentioned that the DCI
is risk-averse in general as typically shareholders in the chemical in-
dustry expect stable proﬁts and dividends, which is reﬂected in the
industry avoiding ﬁnancially risky DER. Conﬁrming the same point, one
of the interviewees mentioned that compared to radical and inter-
mediate DER options, incremental energy saving projects make at-
tractive business cases for the shareholders because those projects have
higher short-term economic returns.
The VNCI [9] emphasises the key role of companies’ high-level
leadership to mobilise resources and actions for moving towards a
decarbonised industry. Visionary leadership can decide to go ahead
with riskier DER business cases that currently are not suﬃciently
proﬁtable. Regarding the contribution of the leadership of chemical
companies in realising the DER targets, the report points to top man-
agement and shareholders that reside outside the Netherlands [9]. In
other words, decisions on the climate-neutral future of companies are
being taken outside of the Dutch political landscape. The report em-
phasises the key role of leadership to improve business cases for several
main DER technologies, by upscaling them and as such de-risking them
[9]. Highlighting this management challenge is consistent with the
interview results on the risk aversion of the shareholders who have
beneﬁted from stable proﬁts. Cecere et al. [37] explain that one of the
main reasons for the attractiveness of incremental improvements for
shareholders is the lower investment costs associated with such projects
compared to the higher costs of radical changes.
Risk aversion on the part of capital providers and shareholders is
part of an engrained system and leads to the perpetuation of the current
situation. However, it does not increase the strength of the incumbent
system as it persists and no increasing returns to adoption in the form of
increased economies of scale, adaptive expectations, learning eﬀects or
network eﬀects could be identiﬁed. Hence, low risk acceptance is
qualiﬁed as a normal barrier and not as carbon lock-in.
3.2.4. Customer behaviour and choice
According to most interviewees, customer buying behaviour is
driven mainly by price and, secondly, by the product quality. It was
argued that, although customers regard low-carbon products favour-
ably, the willingness to pay a higher price is low. While several inter-
viewees indicated that a small but growing group of business customers
buys low-carbon products to meet internal sustainability goals, this is
not expected to drive the DER agenda suﬃciently.
Generally, the chemical industry supplies bulk chemicals to other
manufacturing companies, which produce ﬁnal products, usually mul-
tiple steps down the supply chain. Therefore, the chemical industry is
not much exposed to direct pressure of end-users to produce low-carbon
products. Our interview results are in line with other papers that also
ﬁnd a lack of willingness to pay on the part of customers (businesses)
for low-carbon materials, because customers cannot pass through the
higher price to the end-users [25,63]. Contrary to adaptive expectations
in the concrete industry (see below in the comparison with other sec-
tors), according to our results, customer behaviour in the chemical in-
dustry does not meet any of the characteristics of carbon lock-in.
3.3. Comparison with other sectors
We compared our ﬁndings with carbon lock-in studies in other
sectors. Seto et al. [44] indicate that lock-in may not be coincidental:
they explain that institutional lock-in can be “an intended feature of
institutional design, not an unintended by-product of systemic forces …
to reinforce a status quo trajectory” ([44], p. 433). Wesseling and Van
der Vooren [33] also attribute carbon lock-in to vested interests. Our
results imply that such institutional lock-in indeed exists, but we found
no evidence of intentionality.
We do identify unintentionally counter-productive policy incon-
sistency: by investing in energy eﬃciency of the existing assets prone to
lock-in, investors and policy makers increase the transition costs. Here,
we may ﬁnd a diﬀerence between industry and, for instance, eﬃciency
in coal-ﬁred power, where studies indicate that eﬃciency improvement
increases future ﬂexibility to reduce emissions [40]. We could not lo-
cate quantitative cost estimates of such dynamic interplay between
short- and long-term mitigation options speciﬁcally for industry, but as
an illustration, the International Energy Agency in 2013 estimated that
continuing investment through to 2020 to make incremental changes in
the current fossil fuel-based technological system instead of investing in
low-carbon alternatives could quadruple investment costs for dec-
arbonisation in 2035 [64].
Seto et al. [44] also describe behavioural lock-in (individual, cul-
tural and social practice) in various sectors. Our interviewees conﬁrmed
Seto et al's ﬁndings of multidirectional causation among the carbon
lock-ins and barriers; these lock-ins and barriers aﬀect each other and
can reinforce each other. Seto et al. explain that techno-institutional
lock-in can be strengthened through individual decision-making
(mainly driven by habits, norms and routines) [40,44]. A similar con-
clusion was reached by Unruh [43], who explains how reinvestments in
current technologies can lead to positive feedbacks, and consequently
lock DER options out.
The behavioural lock-in considers the individual consumer beha-
viour as the focal point. In the chemical industry, however, the products
are not directly connected with the end-users in the supply chain. While
companies also show behavioural traits [41], our results indicate that
their behaviour is more driven by price. We therefore identify customer
behaviour as a barrier and not a carbon lock-in.
Wesseling and Van der Vooren [33] note an absence of demand for
cleaner production in their case study on the Dutch cement industry.
They observe such reluctance to buy low-carbon concrete not only with
companies but also with the government, one of the largest cement
procurers. But the price sensitivity of customers may not be the only
explanation of the lack of a market for low-carbon industrial products.
Wesseling and Van der Vooren [33] highlight that procurers are con-
servative about the quality of the clean concrete, leading to risk aver-
sion and delayed diﬀusion and application of clean concrete in the
Netherlands. This is the adaptive expectation characteristic of carbon
lock-in. However, as this is not found in the interviews on the chemical
industry, this is not included in the carbon lock-ins in our paper. Che-
micals have some characteristics, such as more straightforward mea-
surement of the chemical qualities of the products, that may lead one to
believe that this is less of an issue for the chemical industry, but its
appearance in concrete could mean this could be a topic of further
research.
Klitkou et al. [31] investigated lock-in in energy production and
road transportation in the Nordic countries. They arrive at nine lock-in
mechanisms based on previous scholarly work on lock-in: learning ef-
fects, economies of scale, economies of scope, network externalities,
informational increasing returns, technological interrelatedness, col-
lective action, institutional learning eﬀects, and the diﬀerentiation of
power. There are similarities with our ﬁndings in the chemical industry
in learning eﬀects, technological interrelatedness, informational in-
creasing returns, economies of scale, network externalities and collec-
tive action. Because of the relatively large scale and slower turnover of
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capital goods, and speciﬁcity of chemical industry installations, we
could, however, not identify economies of scope (lowering total costs of
production by producing a variety of products together rather than
separately) as a relevant source of carbon lock-in in the chemical in-
dustry.
To what extent are our results generalisable? The technological
incompatibility between electriﬁcation and CCS was emphasised and,
with regard to CCS, may also apply to sectors such as fossil-fuelled
electricity [65]. Our work reinforces earlier studies [4,59] that identify
system integration incompatibility, especially in heat exchange net-
works, as a source of carbon lock-in. As illustrated by a case on district
heating, CCS, as well as industry-based residential heat grids, may be-
come cases of “rolling path dependencies” [66]. It would be worth in-
vestigating this concept further in the context of decarbonisation of
energy-intensive industry.
Industry seems to be a special case for inconsistencies between
(energy) eﬃciency and low-emission technology, highlighted by carbon
lock-in due to policy inconsistency. Such inconsistency also appears in
personal vehicles; investments in improving internal combustion ve-
hicles means that these investments are not done in low-emission al-
ternatives. However, personal vehicles tend to have shorter lifetimes
than industrial assets. Buildings can have very long lifetimes, but any
investment in energy eﬃciency (e.g. insulation) assists low-emission
technology. Hence, carbon lock-in through policy inconsistency seems
to be fairly speciﬁc for energy-intensive industry.
4. Policy implications and responses
All interviewees were asked about policy responses to escape carbon
lock-in and resolve the barriers. Their suggestions are discussed below
in two categories: long-term targets and transition planning, and mixes
of policy instruments, and are related to current policy developments in
the Netherlands, in particular those around the Dutch Climate
Agreement [14].
4.1. Long-term targets and plans
Several interviewees stressed the need for strategic back-casting
studies for companies to spot potential lock-in and barriers. One in-
terviewee proposed the preparation of technology-speciﬁc transition
plans for the 12 largest CO2 emitting companies in the Netherlands
(which the interviewee indicated are jointly responsible for 75% of the
Dutch industrial CO2 emissions). Such transition plans would serve to
ﬁnd windows of opportunity for viable implementation of options that
avoid carbon lock-in. Another interviewee highlighted the unknowns
on industrial symbiosis that make it diﬃcult to make such transition
plans.
In an earlier draft version of the Dutch Climate Agreement [67],
transition plans resembling this suggestion, along with an arrangement
that ﬁnancially assists industry in realising such plans, was included.
However, upon of a public outcry that this would violate the ‘polluter
pays’-principle, this arrangement was replaced by a carbon tax for en-
ergy-intensive industry.
One interviewee suggested the consideration of policies that roll
back chemical industry cluster integration in favour of decentralised
production of chemicals. The current government plans in the Climate
Agreement signal no such developments or intentions as it still ex-
plicitly mentions the industrial clusters [14].
Many interviewees stressed that the government should have a clear
long-term target focusing on DER to make the transition happen, to
resolve the inconsistency (such as between energy saving and DER),
also between diﬀerent governments. In the Dutch Climate Agreement,
this is addressed by the mention of a soft aim of climate neutrality in
2050 for industry and the harder target, also in the Climate Law, of a
49% emission reduction in 2030 compared to 1990, with a possibility of
increasing this 2030 target to 55% [14]. Another interviewee
emphasised that policy consistency and continuity is vital for trust
between the DCI and the government. The current response to this
concern is that the Dutch Climate Agreement is designed to have broad
stakeholder support, including industry [68], although several en-
vironmental NGOs decided to withdraw [69,70].
4.2. Mixes of policy instruments
Many interviewees agreed that the government should apply var-
ious policy instruments to accelerate the industrial transition. A com-
bination of market pull-types of instruments, such as standards, pricing
or taxes, and technology push instruments, such as innovation subsidies
and public investments, was advised by several interviewees.
Most interviewees highlighted that the risks of ﬁrst-of-a-kind pro-
jects need to be reduced to overcome barriers related to risk aversion
(Section 3.2.3) and sunk costs (Section 3.1.3). According to the inter-
viewees, for DER, it is unavoidable that the government subsidises DER
piloting, demonstration and scaling up. One interviewee pointed out
that innovation subsidies can lower risk for the ﬁnanciers of the in-
vestments. The Dutch Climate Agreement [14] and the Climate Plan
[17] both mention innovation subsidies as an important instrument for
industry.
Several interviewees indicated that in the short-term, operating
costs will go up, which would increase the total cost of production. The
same interviewees indicated that an appropriate policy instrument
could compensate for additional operating costs for a limited period of
time. For this, one of the interviewees suggested that the government
provides subsidies for the near-market technologies that still have high
operating costs. The same interviewee indicated that this kind of sup-
port will accelerate commercialisation of DER technologies by bringing
the operating costs down for the companies. This can be done through
ﬁnancing DER infrastructure, especially for CCS, hydrogen and elec-
tricity. Besides the government, the utility provider companies were
also mentioned as key actors to invest and build required infra-
structures for electricity, fuel transport and CO2 transportation. Several
interviewees named the Port Authority of Rotterdam, as a public lim-
ited company, as willing to invest in energy, CCS, steam and heat grid
infrastructures. As a speciﬁc suggestion, one interviewee indicated that
Invest-NL, a new public investment fund, could be helpful to invest in
the needed infrastructure, and hence shorten the payback time of the
DER projects.
In addition, several other interviewees indicated that the DCI should
receive compensation for the diﬀerence between the CO2 price in the
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and the additional operating cost
of DER measures. The same interviewees, although aware of strong
opposition from NGOs, recommended that the government extends the
current subsidy scheme on renewable energy to a subsidy on CO2 re-
ductions, including CCS. This wish was included in the Dutch Climate
Plan [17] which indeed includes an extension of the SDE+ scheme to
CO2-reducing measures in industry. Given resistance against much CCS,
industrial CCS is limited to an annual 7.3 MtCO2.
One of the interviewees indicated that customer buying behaviour
will not change unless the tax system changes in favour of low-carbon
products. Several interviewees advised that the government should help
to develop a market for low-carbon products to provide the appropriate
setting for potential interested customers to buy climate friendly pro-
ducts. The Dutch Climate Plan partly foresees in this: it announces that
public procurement will take into account climate friendliness [17]. In
addition, a carbon tax will be imposed on industry that will be well-
connected with the EU ETS [17], but for which details are not yet
available.
5. Conclusion and recommendations
Based on stakeholder interviews and literature, we found sources of
carbon lock-in in the Dutch chemical industry in ﬁve areas:
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technological incompatibility, system integration, sunk costs, policy
inconsistency and safety routines. The existing installations of the
chemical industry are large-scale and long-lived assets, involving high
sunk costs, leading the chemical industry to continue using the current
installations [71]. At the same time, the existing installations cannot be
operated alongside the new technologies (particularly electriﬁcation). If
DER is to be achieved, existing installations would face early retirement
and hence become stranded assets [44]. A considerable share of the
sunk costs belongs to partly policy-induced incremental energy eﬃ-
ciency improvements that have been implemented over the past dec-
ades [30].
Along with the current technologies that have to be replaced, safety
standards and routines need to be partly developed for new technolo-
gies. Apart from the uncertainties on the safe performance of the new
technologies (which in many cases, have not yet been used at a large
scale), it requires time, new expertise, and investments in new systems.
When DER options are incompatible with existing interconnected
technologies and infrastructures within and outside of the chemical
clusters, a further barrier or even carbon lock-in appears. In industrial
clusters, network eﬀects create greater initial inertia for the incumbent
system, compared to when only a single ﬁrm were involved. However,
when the transition is decided, it could go faster in industrial clusters.
Overall, our results are consistent with earlier studies on carbon lock-in,
including those in other sectors. Our ﬁndings indicate, however, that
for the chemical industry, the carbon lock-ins of system integration and
safety routines are more prominent and others, including those related
to behavioural lock-ins, don't appear because of speciﬁc technological
and institutional characteristics of the DCI.
As for other barriers, operating costs are currently high and so are
uncertainties around those operating costs, in particular costs of feed-
stock and renewable electricity. Moreover, risk acceptance of capital
providers and shareholders is low, therefore they tend to invest on the
existing incumbent technologies due to the uncertainties and high risk
of DER projects. Furthermore, shareholders (and hence the company
boards) are risk-averse and want to see dividends, and, for that reason,
demand low payback times, stable proﬁts and low risks.
We identiﬁed several limitations to our study, which point to di-
rections for further research. First, the fairly small set of interviews
gives a partial image at a particular time; a repeat of the interviews,
possibly involving a broader set of stakeholders could provide more
detailed information. Additional research methods that could be de-
ployed include more structured expert elicitation to explore industrial
carbon lock-in and identify eﬀective and acceptable policy options
[72]. To address the potential role of system integration in carbon lock-
in, further work on the particular regional and industrial characteristics
of chemical industry clusters could be insightful for long-term invest-
ment planning, e.g. for the implementation of renewables-based elec-
triﬁcation. Policy instrumentation to respond to carbon lock-in and
barriers needs to be speciﬁed for various industries in addition to dif-
ferent sectors, and further work beyond Pollitt et al. [73] and Munnings
et al. [74] on policy instrumentation speciﬁc to industry, often exposed
to international trade, would ﬁll a knowledge gap. In terms of in-
novation system analysis, sectoral innovation system assessment [75]
might be a suitable tool for identifying suitable policy actions, espe-
cially in combination with functional analysis.
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